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A missile system in which L launchers were available in
a row and S spare missiles were stored in a continuation of
this row was considered. Additionally, an assortment of
warheads was available, but only one could be mounted in
each missile. The ability of this system to meet a demand
for a particular warhead was dependent on the mix of war-
heads in the L+S missiles and the order in which the
missiles with their varying warheads were mounted on the
launchers and in storage. Since the missiles were in a
continuous row, some missiles would not be available for
firing before the missiles in front of them had been fired.
Because of the myriad possible permutations of the L+S
warheads, determination of optimal ordering of the warheads
by simulation was found to be too time-consuming. Hence,
analytic expressions were developed after an appropriate
measure of effectiveness was devised. A computer program
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SYMBOLS
a. ,a..,a. .. number of targets missed due to
J J availability between the ith and (i-l)st
reload, in the j th section, in the ktn
battery
f f f
a t &. ,a. . number of targets missed after the storage
J
** barn was emptied, by the jth section, in
the k^h battery
A„,AB number of targets missed due to availabilityin a section and a battery respectively.
B number of batteries in a defense
BS ,BR number of targets missed due to reloadingin a section and a battery respectively
F (x) completely specified cumulative distribution
function
L number of launchers in a section
m. ,m,.,m. .. number of targets missed during the i
Ji kji reload, in the jth section, in the kth
battery
Mo,MB ,Mn -total number of targets missed by a section,
a battery, and a defense respectively
M_ maximum number of targets missed
max °
M . minimum number of targets missed
p. probability of a request for a type j
J warhead
^k ,c*k£ weighting factor for a target missed due to
availability by battery k, when it is of
type I
S number of missiles in storage in a section
sk ,sk£ weighting factor for a target missed due




_(x) observed cumulative distribution function of
')j
a random sample of 15,000 observations

T number of reloads required In a section
x'.. type of warhead stored on launcher I,1 i = 1,2,.. .,9. x
±
e (1,2,3,4,5)
y-t»yp»yo probability that a request is for theL
"
-* warhead on launcher #1, #2, or #3
respectively. y± = p, if x± = j , i = 1,2,3

I. INTRODUCTION
Current articles on missile allocation problems make
certain tacit assumptions. The primary assumption is that
all missiles are mounted on their own launchers. Thus, the
problem of determining an optimal mix of missiles becomes
one of determining the optimal mix of all missiles emplaced.
However, a question comes to mind: What if emplacing each
missile on its own launcher is infeasible for reasons of
cost, mobility, maintenance, etc.? Then the missile complex
will consist of a certain number of missiles mounted on
launchers with the remainder in storage. The problem then
becomes two problems: Should the mix of missiles on
launchers be the same as the mix of missiles in storage?
If not, what should the respective mixes be? The two-part
problem could be simplified back to the one-part problem by
assuming that the time necessary to move the missiles in
storage to launching positions will be so long as to render
the stored missiles unavailable to any short run situation,
that is, the storage is a reserve for future battles.
However, if the system is set up so that the stored missiles
can indeed be made available relatively quickly, the
problem of respective mixes becomes crucial.
A further complication also arises when the stored mis-
siles' are not immediately available for reloading, but are
placed in a sequential storage system. An analogy would be
a magazine-fed rifle with a variety of types of rounds

available. The problem would consist not only of the mix
of rounds in the magazine, but also the order in which the
rounds are stored in the magazine. The order is critical
because the rounds are fired sequentially. The situation
can be understood by the following example: Suppose the
magazine holds ten rounds and the only round of a certain
type is placed tenth in the magazine. When the firer wants
to fire that round, he must either fire or eject all of the
intervening rounds. In either case, poor utilization of
resources was caused by the ordering of rounds in the
magazine
.
Returning to the missile problem, it is not likely that
a variety of types of missiles would be stored or emplaced
together. However, the same situation would arise if one
type of missile could be fitted with one of a variety of
warheads. Even though the missiles would have identical
external configurations, they could be considered different
missiles because their use would vary with the warhead
carried.
In summary, a missile site in which the missiles could
be equipped with a variety of warheads and in which the
missiles are placed in a ready storage area with a sequential
reloading mechanism appears to present difficulties in
allocation that are not present in systems commonly studied
in the current literature.
Consequently j this thesis will attempt to establish a
methodology for evaluation of missile sites designed as

described above. The first step will be to establish a
measure of effectiveness suitable for such a system. When
this has been established, further questions can be
answered. The first question considered will be: Does
ordering of warheads have any significant effect? If not,
the question then becomes an academic exercise. If ordering
is indeed significant (as it intuitively appears to be),
further characteristics such as optimal ordering, optimal
mix, or suboptimization, can be explored.
Since a general system will be considered, no definitive,
real-world answers will be obtained. However, by exploring
different possibilities, directions for further research
will be indicated. In short, this thesis will describe the
necessity of a separate methodology for evaluation of
sequential ordered systems.

II. THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM
For this study, the launching area consists of three
separate sections of three launchers and a storage barn
holding six missiles. Thus the entire launching area (one
battery) contains twenty-seven missiles when fully loaded.
Further, it is assumed that five separate types of warheads
can be installed in each missile [Headquarters, Department
of the Army 1968]. Additionally, the mix of warheads in
this battery is considered to be determined by some other
agency. Any warhead can be mounted on any missile with all
missiles completely identical in external configuration and
hence, no specific considerations need be given about placing
a certain type of warhead in any particular one of the twenty-
seven available missiles. However, once emplaced, each mis-
sile has utility dependent upon which type of warhead is
installed and where the missile is located in its section.
An additional restriction upon availability of missiles
is that a missile in a section can be moved to another sec-
tion only at a time expense of several hours since the mis-
sile has to be manually disassembled, moved to its new sec-
tion, and reassembled. For safety reasons then, a section
can not fire while a missile is being stocked. Another
feature is that men must manually move the missiles from the
storage locations onto the launchers during the reloading
process. Hence, a section is out of action while either
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reloading or restocking is accomplished. The launching area
has enough personnel to conduct reloading operations in all
three sections simultaneously. However, only one missile
can be moved at a time in each section. The three sections
are separated far enough that two sections can be reloading
when the third section is firing. Since the restocking
operation is so time consuming, its ramifications are con-
sidered to be strategic, rather than tactical, and are not
considered in this analysis.
Because of the sequential organization, each missile
has to be moved across all positions between their storage
position and the destined launcher. This is best illus-
trated by an example:
onooooooo123123^56
1 4 l 1
Launchers Storage Barn
Suppose the missile in storage #5 has to be moved to
launcher #2. The missile has to move across storage posi-
tions #4, #3, #2 and #1 as well as launcher #3- For this to
be feasible, the five intervening positions have to be empty.
The only way this can occur is if the missiles had been
fired, i.e. no means exists of disposing of a missile
preventing a desired move. These missiles could have been
fired only from the launchers. Hence, the four empty
positions in the storage area indicated that previous to this
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move, the first four missiles had been moved to the
launchers and fired.
Consequently, if a desired warhead is in storage #4 and
storages #3, #2, and #1 are full, the desired warhead would
be inaccessible and, in effect, nonexistent for the engage-
ment. This inaccessibility is obvious when it is considered
that at best (for this situation) all three launchers could
be empty. If this was the case, the missiles in storages
#3> #2, and #1 could be moved onto the launchers. But then
the desired missile in storage #4 still could not be fired
because all launchers would be full. If one of these
missiles was fired, the desired missile could then be moved
onto a launcher. In summary, one missile has to be fired
before the desired missile could possibly be fired.
The decision as to which of the five types of warheads
available is desired for each firing is made external to
the launching area. Due to this, the decision in the
launching area consists of either being able to satisfy the
request for a warhead or not . This capability is dependent
upon the total mix of warheads in the launching area, and
the order in which the warheads (in their missiles) are
placed In the three launching sections. It is also assumed
that each request for a warhead is independent of all others
and that the p. are available from the intelligence
community
.
The over-all firing pattern for this system is a shoot-
look-shoot technique. That is, after a missile is fired,
12

the results of its detonation are assessed before the next
round is fired. Thus the battery would have only one missile
in the air at a given time. This has the effect that the
battery engages only one target at a time no matter how many
are within range. Thus, if many mobile targets are available,
the battery would engage them serially until: (1) all targets
are destroyed, (2) no targets are left within range, (3) no
missiles are available on the launchers (reloading would
enable reengagement) , or (4) all missiles have been fired.
13

III. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
A measure of effectiveness must concern the ability
of a battery to perform Its mission i.e. engage targets.
This can possibly be measured by the number of targets not
engaged out of the total targets available. This possibility
has certain drawbacks. One is that the number of targets
missed would be influenced as much by number of targets
available as by the mix and ordering of warheads e.g., if
fifty targets- were presented, at least twenty-three would be
missed (only twenty-seven missiles available); if 100 tar-
gets were presented, at least 73 targets or 73% would be
missed, etc. This difficulty is avoided by considering the
number of targets not engaged prior to the last missile
being fired. This end point is used because restocking is
not considered possible in a tactical time frame.
As was mentioned in the description of the system, only
one target may be engaged at a time, regardless of the number
of targets available. Hence, if a sufficient number of
targets are available, ordering of warheads and reloading
time are the governing factors of number of targets not
engaged because no time would be available for reloading
due to lack of targets. Actually, this condition can exist
for analysis by assuming that the opponent is using saturation
tactics. This is not a really gross assumption; it is
merely assuming that the opponent is using optimal tactics
[Waddell 1963]. This optimality is easily understood when
14

one considers the situation that would exist if saturation
tactics were not used. If the targets were spread out in
time and/or space, the battery could possibly be able to
reload without paying a penalty in terms of inability to
engage targets due to reloading.
A discussion of the role of time in this analysis is
needed. When a section goes out of action in order to re-
load, the length of time that elapses until the section Is
again ready to fire has a direct effect upon the engagement
capability of the battery. In order to make the transfor-
mation from distance each missile is moved during reload to
time elapsed, it is assumed that the time required to move
any missile to its adjacent position is constant; this
constant is called one time unit. Hence to move a missile
from storage #4 to launcher #2, five moves are required and
consequently, five time units elapse. If, in addition, a
move is made from storage #5 to launcher #3» five more time
units would elapse or a total of ten time units would be
required for the reload process.
The next problem Is to relate the reload time to tar-
gets not engaged. As has already been explained, sufficient
targets are available so that the battery can engage the
next target immediately upon the detonation of the previous
missile. Hence, the time between firings will be the fly-
out time plus the reaction time, which is assessment time
(was the target destroyed?) plus decision time (reengage
the same target? what warhead?). A common assumption in air
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defense analysis is that the reaction time is constant
[United States Army Air Defense School 1971] and was assumed
to be so in this paper. Consideration of the fly-out time
immediately reveals that this is a variable depending on
speed of the missile, speed of the target, range of the tar-
get, path of the target, etc. If this fly-out time plus
reaction time for some firing is longer than one time unit
(as defined above), the battery could move one missile one
place in each of the three sections without any decrease in
engagement ability for it could not fire while the missile
was in flight anyway. This would be an obvious benefit
for the battery. However, virtually the only way to deter-
mine various fly-out times during a battle would be simula-
tion due to the myriad parameters mentioned above. In this
paper, it is assumed that the fly-out time is constant in
order to enhance analysis.
Consideration of the magnitude of the constant fly-out
time is necessary. Since both fly-out time and response time
are constant, time between firings is now constant. If the
time unit for reloading as defined above is less than this
constant time between firing, the battery would be able to
take advantage of the situation mentioned in the previous
paragraph, i.e. movement of missiles with no penalty.
In the situation in which the reload time unit is greater
than or equal to the inter-firing time, the equality case
provides the lower limit of number of targets missed due to
reloading. For instance, if the reload time unit is twice
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as long as the inter-firing times, a reload requiring five
time units would cause ten targets to be missed, while if
the reload time unit is equal to the inter-firing time, only
five targets would be missed during a reload of five time
units. As a result, it is assumed that the reload time unit
is equal to the inter-firing time. Consequently, this study
yields a lower limit on targets missed due to reloading.
This is the same as saying that this study provides an upper






Once a raid is detected, the battery commander selects
a target, decides upon a suitable warhead, and orders the
launching area to electrically prepare a missile containing
the desired warhead for firing. At this point, the launching
area either has the appropriate warhead available or not.
Whether the desired one of the five possible types is in a
position to be fired (on a launcher) depends upon the mix
of the basic load, the order in which the basic load was
stored, and the reloading policy. As was mentioned previously,
the mix is assumed to be fixed by some external agency. The
decision variable available to the battery is the order of
storage of the warheads (which launcher or what position in
storage would be the best location for each missile). This
decision variable together with the reloading policies forms
the battery's control of its ability to engage targets.
The question of optimal reloading doctrine is very dif-
ficult because at least two policies are possible. The first
is to move only enough missiles to refill empty launchers.
This allows short reload times at the beginning of the air
battle. However, as the battle continues, reload times ra-
pidly increase because the missiles have to be moved farther.
For instance, suppose two missiles have been fired when a
section enters reload status. In this case, the first and
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second missiles in storage could be moved onto the launchers
very quickly. Now suppose storage locations #1 to #4 are
empty due to previous reloading. When reloading is again
commenced, the missile in storage #5 (the closest available)
obviously has to be moved across the four empty storage
positions. Naturally this takes far longer than moving the
missile in storage #2 onto a launcher.
The second possible policy is to move all missiles as
far as possible each time the section reloads. This policy
causes the longest reload times to be at the beginning of
the air battle and hence, causes the reload times to decrease
with each successive reload. For instance, suppose one mis-
sile has been fired when reload occurs. The missile in
storage #1 would be moved onto the launchers, storage #2
would be moved to storage #1, etc., until all missiles in
storage have been moved. In total, six missiles would be
moved one position each. It should be noticed that at the
finish of reloading, the empty storage location is at the
far end of the storage barn i.e. storage #6 is empty. No
missile is ever moved across empty storage locations under
this policy.
The contrast between the two policies is easily dis-
cerned when a simpler system is considered, i.e. only one
launcher and six storage locations. Under the first policy,
the first reload takes one time unit (storage #1 moves to the
launcher), the second reload takes two time units (storage
#2 moves across storage HI to the launcher) and so on. A
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total of twenty-one time units would elapse during reloading.
This is the sum: 1+2+3+4+5+6. Under the second policy,
the first reload takes six time units (storage #1 moves to
the launcher, storage #2 moves to storage #1, ..., storage
#6 moves to storage #5). During the second reload, five time
units would elapse (five missiles move one position) and so
on.- Thus, total time elapsed is 6+5+4+3+2+1=21. The dif-
ference in order of the two equal sums reflects the differ-
ence in the two policies. Because the first policy allows
the shortest reload times at the beginning of the battle, it
is assumed that this reloading policy would be followed.
This has the intuitive appeal that during any attack of short
duration the minimum time will be lost due to reload policy
while during any attack of sufficiently long duration to
exhaust all missiles in the section a decision maker would
be indifferent between the two policies.
It should be noted that this policy assumes that each
reload was a complete reload. For example, if two launchers
were empty when the section stopped to reload, both launchers
were filled. The difference in the two reloading policies
resulted from movement inside the storage barn. It certainly
is a feasible policy not to completely reload each time.
However, the decision rules on when to and when not to reload
completely are very tenuous and thus are extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to model. Hence, the model in this study
includes a complete reloading policy.
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Additionally, another reloading policy has to be estab-
lished; this policy concerns when the section reloads as
opposed to how the section reloads as discussed above. The
section has to reload at least twice: fire three missiles,
reload, fire three missiles, reload. At the most the sec-
tion would reload six times: fire first missile, reload,
fire second missile, reload, . . . , fire sixth missile,
reload.
A possible policy Is to require a reload after a fixed
number of missiles have been fired, e.g. always reload after
two missiles have been fired. However, this policy ignores
the purpose of the section i.e. provide warheads/missiles
requested by the battery commander to engage the target,
because the next request might have been for the last mis-
sile available. Rather than use such a policy, this study
assumes a policy based upon the series of demands for war-
heads. The policy is to stop to reload whenever a demand
cannot be satisfied exactly. This policy includes the fea-
ture that if the request for a warhead cannot be satisfied
exactly, the request is shifted to another section. If the
request cannot be satisfied in the battery, the target is
allowed to pass unengaged. This assumption is not as
reckless as it immediately appears. This type of missile
unit is considered to be part of a defense-ln-depth. Thus
the fact that one battery does not engage a target does not
imply that the target reaches its objective unscathed
because batteries further behind could possibly engage It.
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Of course, if the battery is not a part of a defense-in-*
depth or is the last battery in line, such a policy would
be questionable. However, for this study it is assumed that
this is a realistic procedure.
The exact response procedure requires some consideration.
If the warheads can be placed in some order of effectiveness,
such as size of explosive warhead, it is conceivable that a
firing policy could exist in which a request for one type of
warhead could be answered with that exact type or with a
bigger type warhead. This policy would be a realization of
a minimum-assurance-of-destruction philosophy. Unfortunately,
further consideration makes it obvious that under such firing
policy, the battery would soon be left with only small war-
heads. Additionally, it is conceivable that the warheads
cannot be placed in an order of effectiveness. For instance,
the warheads could be designed for such diverse objectives
that they could have only a nominal rather than an ordinal
ordering. As a result of these considerations as well as
the defense-in-depth concept, it is assumed that the firing
policy will be an exact response or none.
Given this exact response procedure, the reason for an
either fire or reload policy becomes slightly more apparent.
As was discussed previously, the interarrival times of tar-
gets are assumed to be a constant equal to one time unit
where one time unit is the time required to move a missile
over one position. Hence, if a request cannot be met, one
time unit is immediately available for reloading.
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Consequently, the policy In this study is to either fire or
reload depending on whether a desired warhead is available
or not.
Another reloading policy must be established. This
policy concerns the decision as to which launcher would be
designated to fill a request when two or more missiles with
appropriate warheads are on the launchers. For example, if
launchers #1 and #3 both contain the same type warhead and
a request arrives for that type warhead, a decision has to
be made concerning which launcher (#1 or #3) will be used
to fill the request.
Intuitively, it would seem that launcher #3 is the best
choice because, if the section stops to reload on the next
request, launcher #3 can be more quickly refilled than if
#1 is empty and the missiles on launchers #2 and #3 must
both be moved over one position and then one missile moved
out of storage. This procedure is used in the analysis.
However, to be sure that intuition does indeed hold true,
its validity is checked in the investigation portion of this
thesis
.
B. ANALOGY TO A MARKOV CHAIN
Since the interarrival rate of requests is a constant,
the stream of requests forms a deterministic queue. As the
requests arrive, they can either be filled or not filled.
If it is filled, a missile is fired and a counter (the state
variable) increases by one. If the request is not filled,
reloading occurs and the state variable remains constant
23

for the number of time units required for the reloading
because firing is impossible during reloading. This con-
tinues until the state variable reaches a value of nine
because then the section would be empty. This procedure
forms a pure birth process with a discrete time space, a
special case of Markov Chains. The number of time units
elapsed until the state variable reaches nine indicates the
number of targets missed due to. reloading because each time
unit elapsed is equivalent to one target missed since it
has been assumed that the inter-firing time is equal to the
reloading time unit.
A modification of the Markov Chain analogy is necessary.
Immediately after the finish of reloading, another request
arrives. If this request cannot be filled, the time variable
does not increase because no reloading is required (all
launchers would be filled) and no targets are missed due to
reloading. As a result, the time parameter increases after
a reload are conditioned on the arrival of a request that
could be filled. All intervening unfilled requests are
ignored.
Continuing the Markov Chain analogy, this study Is
interested in the number of time increments elapsing from
the beginning until the state parameter reaches nine. At
least nine increments will pass because one missile is fired
each time increment. As was mentioned above, at least two
reloads will be necessary and as many as six may occur.
Hence, the time parameter will be considerably larger than
24

nine. Actually, this study is concerned with the number of
time increments during which the state parameter remains
constant because all possible arrangements of warheads will
require the nine time increments to fire the missiles. The
objective is to discover if it is possible to affect signif-
icantly the number of time increments required and its




This analysis will concern a section consisting of
three launchers and a storage barn for six missiles; thus
nine missiles will be considered. Additionally, each mis-
sile is equipped with one of five possible warheads. Thus
x2
=3 indicates that the missile in position #2 contains a
type 3 warhead. For the rest of this discussion, the mis-
sile will be referred to as a type 3 missile since, even
though the missiles are all constructed identically, the
different warheads cause each to be used for different
purposes
.
There exist seven possible configurations of empty
launchers when the section stops to reload. These seven
possibilities come from the fact that position #1 or posi-
tion #2 or position #3 will be empty where the "or" is the
mathematical inclusive "or". Since there exist three posi-
tions that are empty or full, there are 2 J or eight possible
configurations of empty launchers. However, one possible
configuration is that all launchers are full. This possi-
bility has no physical meaning because the section will not
stop to reload if it has not fired any missiles. An alter-
nate and equally valid interpretation is that zero time
will be required in order to reload. Either way, the con-




Now, the seven possible configurations are not equally
likely. In fact, the probability of a certain configuration
being realized is dependent upon what missiles (that is,
warheads) are on the launchers and the probability that each
type of warhead is requested. Y, can be interpreted as the
probability that a request will be for the warhead on
launcher #k and equivalent ly, the probability that launcher
#k is empty when the section stops to reload.
For an illustration, the probability that the second
and third launchers are empty when the section stops to
reload is
2y py (1 -y. )2 3 (1)
y;L
+ y 2 + y 3
The numerator is the probability that two independent events
occur and that the two can occur in two different orders.
The factor in parenthesis is the probability of a failure
on the third request; this is a necessary term to ensure
that exactly two requests are satisfied. The denominator is
the conditioning factor. The conditioning is the probability
that one success has occurred. Hence, the total expression
is the probability that launchers #2 and #3 are empty when
the section reloads given that one request has been fired.
This conditioning is necessary because any targets missed
before the first firing are ignored.
During the reloading process, for this illustration,
the missile in storage #1 is moved to launcher #2 (2 time
27

units required) and the missile in storage #2 is moved to
launcher #3(2 time units required). By the model threat
characteristics described previously, the four time units
consumed result in four requests unfilled. The section is
then able to resume answering requests because its launchers
are filled — but possibly with warheads different from the
original set; four requests have been missed; and storage
locations #1 and §2 are empty. The probability that this
situation is reached when the section is ready for the
second round is given by Equation (1). The formulae for
calculating the probability of all seven possible situations
are given in Table I.
It must be noted that Equation (1) assumed that all
warheads on the launchers are different. However, this is
not certain. The formulae for calculating the probability
of each, configuration occurring in the four situations in
which two or three of the three warheads are identical are
given in Tables II, III, IV, and V. Note that in Tables
I to V, the probability formulae sum to one. This Is
necessary since each table is an exhaustive list of all
possible configurations when the section stops to reload.
Additionally, Tables II to V indicate that some of the pos-
sible configurations of empty launchers have a probability
of zero. This is due to the reloading doctrine requiring
that when more than one launcher could fill a request, the
one closest to the storage barns will be used.
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In order to discover how many requests are not filled,
it is only necessary to sum the number of requests that
are missed each time the section reloads until the storage
barn is emptied — for then the section would no longer stop
to reload. The probability of missing that sum would be
the probability of realizing that particular series of
empty launcher configurations.
As an illustration, consider a basic load of warheads
emplaced in the following manner: {12345123 4}
where {12 3) are on the launchers and {1 5 1 2 3 ^ are in
the storage barn. Suppose all three launchers are emptied.
The probability of this event is (from Table I since all







During this reload, nine time units would be required (stor-
age missile #4 to launcher #1, ... , storage missile #6 to
launcher #3) and consequently, nine requests are unfilled.
The section is then ready to fire again. Suppose all three
launchers are emptied again. This reloading will cause
eighteen requests to be unfilled and the probability of this
happening Is Equation (2) again. Hence, the probability of









This procedure can be followed for all possible sequences
of reloading by keeping track of requests missed and multi-
plying appropriate probabilities as required from Tables
I to V.
Unfortunately, there exist a very large number of paths
in the resulting decision tree. This is evident when it is
considered that each node can have up to seven paths leading
from it. It is true that one branch ends after two nodes
(the one described immediately above), but other branches
would continue for six nodes (only one missile fired each
time the section stopped to reload). Consequently, an
evaluation of the distribution of targets missed has to be
accomplished by either computer calculation of the probabil-
ities in the decision tree or computer simulation of the
system.
In order to have some means of judging the validity of
the computer calculations (see Computer Program I), three
criteria are used. The first criterion is that the calcu-
lated mass function for number of requests not filled must
sum to one. This is not as trivial as it sounds. The pro-
gram is designed to feature separate calculations for each
possible branch and then add the calculated branch mass to
the mass of the appropriate point in the domain of the missed
request random variable. If, after all possible branch
masses have been calculated, the sum is indeed one, it can
be felt that the program covers all possible branches. This
indirect type of assurance of validity is needed for such a
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program because it is impossible to manually verify the
results. Additionally, the computer solution can keep track
of the number of branches that yield each particular value
of targets missed.
Another criterion established to judge the validity of
the computer solution involves the minimum possible results.
Examination of the reloading system reveals a situation
that appears to yield the minimum number of targets missed.
The situation is that only one launcher is empty each time
reloading is commenced and that this launcher is the one
closest to the storage barn. In other words, six reloads
are required, each one with launcher #3 empty. The total
requests missed in this case is twenty-one. In general,
for a section configured such as the one in this study and
with this measure of effectiveness, the minimum number of
failures to supply requested warheads will be:
S
M . = I i (4)
min i=1
The last criterion concerns the maximum number of
requests missed. This arises when only one missile has been
fired between each reload but launcher #1 is empty rather
than launcher #3. In other words, instead of the empty
launcher being the closest to storage, the empty space is
the farthest from storage. The first reload would cause
three requests to be missed because launcher #2 must be
moved to launcher #1, launcher #3 then moved to launcher #2,
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and finally storage #1 moved to launcher #3. In similar
fashion, the second reload causes four requests to be missed
until the sixth and last reload causes eight requests to be
missed.
In summary, the total number of targets missed will be
8 8 2Zi= E i - Z i
1=3 i=l 1-1
The right hand side has the intuitive content that the
first term predicts the number of unfilled requests if the
system consisted of one launcher and a storage of eight.
This is completely analogous to Equation (4). But since
this was not a single launcher system, the second term is
a correction term for the intervening launchers. The second
term is the number of requests missed if the missiles on
launchers #2 and #3 would indeed have to be moved to
launcher #1. Since these two missiles do not move in such
fashion, the sum is subtracted from the total. This result
is easily expanded to the general case:
S+L-l L-l
M I i - Z i (6)
max i=l i=l
The analytical program was run on several test cases
utilizing Tables I to V. In all cases the calculated mass
function summed to a number larger than .9999 and had a
domain from 21 to 33 (the limits predicted by Equations (4)
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and (6)). Hence, it appeared that the program was indeed
performing properly and thus could be used to calculate the
mass functions of number of targets for any possible
permutation of warheads and probabilities of requests for
each type of warhead.
During conduct of this trial phase, one surprising
result was noticed. The minimum number of targets missed
in all cases was twenty-one as predicted. However, the
output of the program indicated that this result was
achieved in as many as four ways instead of only one way
(the one used to establish Equation (4)). It was not pos-
sible to easily find the alternate paths to this minimum




A method of validating computer solutions Is to find
the solution by another method. In this situation, computer
simulation Is a convenient alternative. Accordingly, a
simulation was constructed embodying all the characteristics
discussed previously (see Computer Program II). A random
number generator was included to produce a series of
requests of warheads In accordance with the p. . With the
request, the computer then determined If a matching warhead
was on the launchers. If so, the position (x- ) was set to
a value of zero and another request was generated. If not,
reloading was accomplished, a record of requests missed
during reloading was updated, and then the next request was
generated. This procedure continued until the storage barn
was emptied. Then a counter corresponding to the number of
requests missed was increased (if 27 requests were missed,
the counter for event "27" was increased by one), the
section was reinitialized to the original basic load of
warheads, and a new stream of requests was presented to the
section. This procedure was performed for a fixed number
of repetitions and then an observed mass function was cal-
culated by dividing the observed occurrence of each event,
e.g. total number of times that 23 requests were missed, by
the total number of repetitions. Additionally, records were
maintained of the requests in order to ensure the proper




Table VI presents the simulated mass function of the
random variable, requests missed, for varying numbers of
repetitions. It will be noticed that a very large number
of repetitions was necessary in order to produce a steady
mass function.
Using the KOlmogorov-Smirnoff test to determine if the
simulation results from a sample of 15,000 could have been
realized from the analytical mass function [Siegel 1956],
it was determined that the mass function yielded by the
simulation did indeed come from the analytical mass function,
that is, the two were identically distributed. The size of
this hypothesis test was .05 [Zehna 1970]. In other words,
there existed a 5% probability that the test could have
declared the two mass functions different when in fact they
were identical (See Table VII). This result was very encour-
aging since the author had very high confidence that the
simulation accurately performed in the manner of the modeled
system. With the hypothesis test revealing that the simula-
tion and the analytical model produced the same results, it
was felt that the analytical work was accurate.
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VII. INVESTIGATION OF THE SYSTEM'S CHARACTERISTICS
Since the number of requests missed due to reloading
time is a random variable, some means are necessary to
determine if one mass function is preferable to another
mass function. The different mass functions would result
from different ordering of the warheads in the section.
The most familiar criterion and easiest to calculate and
understand for ranking desirability of random variables is
that of relative sizes of expected values. This criterion
ranks mass functions in order of their expected values. In
this study, the objective is to minimize requests missed due
to reloading. Hence, the arrangement of warheads that
produces the smallest expected value of the random variable
would be the most desirable arrangement.
However, another more inclusive criterion is available.
This is ordering by survivor functions. For a random vari-
able M, the survivor function is defined as:
F(m) = Prob{M>m} (7)
where m is an element of the domain of the random variable M.
Note that the survivor function satisfies
F(m) = 1.0 - F(m) (8)
where F(m) is the well known cumulative distribution function
For two random variables M, and Mp (resulting from two war-




_> E(M2 ) . Hence, If while comparing two particular
warhead arrangements, it could be shown that F\(t)
_> F ? (t),
a considerably stronger ranking would be known because the
expected value ranking would be identical. On the other
hand, if it is shown that the two expected values are dif-
ferent, nothing is known (without further calculations)
about the stronger ranking.
With this knowledge, it can then be determined what
warhead orderings are preferable to others. For example,
Tables VIII, IX, and X provide the expected values and sur-
vivor functions for three different arrangements of one mix
of warheads. Examination reveals that E, Q < E q < En with E q
and Eg virtually equal. Also it is noted that F, Q <_ Fq and
F, '<_ Pn while P
q
and Pn have no clear cut dominance. This
can be expected since their expected values are so close to
each other. Thus the warhead arrangement in Table X is




reveals a discrepancy. Pq does not
become .0000 at m=3^ as necessary because m=33 was the
largest value of m with a nonzero mass. The explanation is
that the analytic program yields a mass function that does
not sum exactly to one and the difference appears as the
nonzero value of F
q
at m=3^«
At this point, it is apparent how the best warhead
arrangement can be determined i.e. find the permutation of
warheads that yields a mass function that dominates all
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other possible mass functions. Unfortunately, there exist
numerous possible permutations of any given mix of nine
warheads. The upper limit of possible permutations would
occur when the mix is 2:2:2:2:1. In this case, the number
of permutations would be
(2!)(2!)(2!)(2!)(1!) = 7560 (9)
[Hickman 1971]. It is immediately evident that the size of
this task is overwhelming. If It was judged worthwhile, the
optimal permutation could be obtained by using the analytical
computer program to calculate the mass function for every one
of the possible permutations and then use the two criteria
described above to find the best permutation. It is cer-
tainly conceivable that a unique solution would not exist.
However, the criteria would still be able to eliminate poor
permutations until a set was delineated that could not be
differentiated further. At this point, an arbitrary selec-
tion would be in order. It is noted that this process in
essence eliminates poor choices and then selects a solution
from the remaining possibilities instead of finding the
optimal solution directly.
Since finding the set of "best" permutations Involves
evaluating all possible permutations, some faster method
is desirable because the computer analytical evaluation of
each mass function requires approximately four seconds.
The upper limit on possible run times is then slightly under
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eight and one-half hours! In an effort to determine char-
acteristics of the arrangement in Table X which were not
present in the arrangements in Tables VIII and IX, it was
noticed that the warheads were placed in a nondecreasing
order of likelihood of request, e.g. Pt- warheads were on
the launchers while p, warheads were in the rear of the
storage barn when Pn^Pp^PoilPiiiLPr •
As a result, a factorial computer experiment was con-
ducted. Two effects were considered: (1) the effects of
the monotone arrangement of warheads, and (2) the effects
of the firing policy of firing the launcher closest to the
barn when two missiles on the launchers contained the
desired warhead. The question concerning the latter effect
was explained earlier. The experiment was conducted with
the simulation since it had been shown to yield very accu-
rate results and was easier to modify than the analytic
program.
Comparison of parts A and B of Table XI revealed that
the firing doctrine had virtually no effect on the perform-
ance of the section loaded in the manner shown. This seemed
reasonable since the doctrine concerned situations In which
two or three -identical warheads were on the launchers. With
the loading plan as shown, duplication of warheads would not
occur very often and hence, the firing doctrine would have
little opportunity to manifest itself.
Examination of Tables XII and XIII revealed that, for
the permutations of warheads which caused frequent duplica-
tion of warheads on the launchers, the firing doctrine
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under study resulted in a dominance by expected values and
by survivor functions in both tables. Hence, the assumption
previously made to use this doctrine appears to be
reasonable.
With this doctrine established as beneficial, examination
of part A of Tables XI, XII, and XIII revealed that Table
XIII dominated both Tables XI and XII at the survivor func-
tion level. It was also indicated that no particular
dominance existed between Tables XI and XII. Even though
the expected value of Table XI was less than that in Table
XII, the difference was so slight that any declaration of
dominance would be reckless because simulation was used to
obtain the results.
At' this point it was again noticeable that the permuta-
tion of warheads with a nondecreasing ordering of warheads
yielded the dominant mass function. Many more trials could
have been conducted, but since so many orderings were
possible (perhaps, it was not necessary for a nondecreasing
ordering but merely an overall upward trend in probability)
the procedure seemed to promise little additional knowledge
in return for much more computer run time. In fact, several
more trials were conducted with no results contradicting the
principle delineated above.
Instead, an explanation was discovered for why the non-
decreasing orderings appeared to be the rule of dominant
permutations. Based upon the probability formulae in Tables
I to V and the results of considering the firing doctrine
HO

of closest-launcher versus farthest-launcher in case of
duplication, it was discernable that, in terms of requests
missed during reload, it was preferable to have the empty
launchers closest to the storage barn whenever possible.
Actually this is in keeping with judgement: if two launchers
are empty, it is best that they are launchers §2 and #3
because missiles can be moved directly from storage to a
launcher without losing time moving a missile between
launchers. Subsequently, the question arose: given three
warheads to be placed on the launchers, what is the best
arrangement to ensure that launcher #3 would be empty more
often than #2 and that #2 would be empty more often than #1?
If the three warheads are identical, the firing doctrine
could ensure the desired configuration; if the three war-
heads are not identical, it is obvious that the best arrange-
ment is to put the warhead most likely to be requested on
launcher #3, the warhead next most likely to be requested on
launcher #2, etc.
When consideration is given to what warhead should be
placed in storage #1 after the three on the launchers have
been placed, it appears that the same principle applies.
The warhead in storage #1 should have a p. greater than or
equal to y,, because the warheads on the launchers have
already been arranged so that launcher #3 would most likely
be empty. With launcher #3 empty, the missile in storage #1
would be moved to the launcher. When this occurs, it would
still be desired that y. > y„ > y,. This would be
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accomplished when storage #1 has a p. greater than or equal
to y,. This reasoning is then immediately extended to all
positions in the storage barn;. In conclusion, it can be
established that the number of requests not filled due to
reloading will be minimized by arranging the given assortment
of warheads in an order beginning with the least requested
warhead on launcher #1, an equally or more likely warhead on
launcher #2, and so on until all' nine warheads are positioned.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At this point, the object of the study has been
achieved: Specifically, it is known what principle of
ordering warheads in a sequential storage system will
result in the minimum number of unfilled requests. However,
an examination of the principle reveals a startling conclu-
sion: the best ordering for minimizing misses due to
reloading causes the worst performance in terms of availa-
bility! This is immediately evident when the permutation
in Table X is considered. With the reloading policies as
specified in this study, no penalty is Suffered for requests
missed until the first success. The permutation enhanced
the probability that this first success would be on launcher
#3 j a situation shown to be best. Then since the least
likely requested warheads were on the launchers, it is most
likely that the next request will not be filled and by
policy, the section then stops to reload. It was indicated
earlier that the sequence of firing once and then reloading
led to the minimum number of misses during reloading, i.e.
21 misses.
But consideration has to be given to the number of
misses until the first success after each reloading. This
number is a random variable with a geometric distribution.
The single parameter of this distribution is the probability
of a success on a single request. In this case, the
parameter is the probability that a request is for a warhead
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on the launchers. However, the optimal ordering discovered
earlier placed the least probable warheads on the launchers,
Hence, the size of the parameter would be small. The con-
sequence is that, since the expected value of a geometric
distribution is the reciprocal of the parameter, the number
of misses before the first success would be large. In
summary, the ordering of warheads that minimizes number of
requests missed due to reloading simultaneously maximizes
the number of requests missed due to availability! The
immediate conclusion is that the optimal ordering sequence
is extremely sensitive to the objective function.
More formally, consider an objective function:
T
M = Z (a. + m, ) + af . (10)
s i=l 1 1
This form of the objective function is more meaningful when
the sequence of events in a section is considered. When the
section begins the battle, a number of requests will be
missed at first (a, ) because of the type of warheads available
on the launchers. This number would be a geometric random
variable whose parameter depends on y,, y 2 , and y^. Then
either one, two, or three requests will be filled after which
the section will stop to reload. A certain number of
requests would be missed during reloading (m.,) . This number
would be a random variable depending on which launchers were
empty and which storage locations were filled. After




2 ). This variable would again be distributed geometrically
but with a parameter different from the first. At least one
success will be experienced and then reloading will again
occur with m
2
requests missed. This will continue until the
last reload (T) empties the storage barn. T is a discrete
random variable with a domain of 2, 3> ^ » 5» 6 (as was
explained earlier) . The mass function of this discrete
random variable is not readily apparent. Finally, after the
storage barn is empty, a certain number of requests will be
missed until all warheads on the launchers are requested (a ).
This number will be similar to a negative binomial random
variable with a parameter depending on the p. of the last
three warheads
.
Rearrangement of (10) yields
T T
M = I a, + E m, + af . (11)S i=l 1 i=l 1
where the first term is a random sum of a variety of possible
geometric distributions, and the second term is a random sum
of random misses and the last term is similar but not iden-
tical to a negative binomial distribution. Hence, M is the
sum of three random variables each with a rather complex
mass function. As a result, the mass function of M would be
extremely difficult to develop analytically.
This study concentrated on the second term by setting
the first and third terms to zero by the defense-in-depth
capability. The analysis shown on Tables I to V provided
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the mass function of the second term. The result was that
the objective of this study was to minimize
T
B_ = I m, . (12)S i=l 1
This was found to be accomplished by placing the" least
likely warheads on the launchers first. Examination of
this result revealed that this policy would make
A = E a, + ar (13)S i=l 1
a comparatively large number. Intuition based upon earlier
comments indicated that if the objective had been to minimize
A , the optimal policy would be the opposite of that found
s
in the previous chapter, i.e. most likely warheads placed
on the launchers and each warhead's location based on
descending size of p . . Further intuition also indicates
that if the objective had been to minimize M , that is mini-
5
mize the number of targets missed due to both reloading and
availability, the optimal arrangement would be a compromise
between the two extreme arrangements called for by minimizing
either A o or B_ individually. Of course, these two possibles s
objectives should be subjected to formal analysis in order
to determine if the insights gained in this thesis were




After that Is accomplished, investigation could be




since a battery consists of three sections. Substitution of





/ 3 T 3
E E an + Z a.
3-1 i=l J j=l J
/
3 T




Analogous to the section, it could be assumed that
missing a request due to availability does not incur any
penalty because other batteries exist to handle targets
missed. In which case, the objective would be to minimize
BR . Similarly, the objective could be to minimize AR or to
minimize MR . At this level, suboptimization might also
arise in that the policy that optimizes one section might
not optimize the battery If all three sections were loaded
in accordance with an optimal section plan. For example, as
was mentioned above, a section ordering plan to minimize M
would likely be a compromise between the extreme strategies
demanded to minimize A or B . However, the optimal ordering
s s
for a MR might consist of two sections ordered to minimize A
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and one section ordered to minimize B c rather than alls
three ordered to minimize M .
s
In a continuation of the structuring effort, an objective
for an entire defense would be
B B
M = E MR = E (AR + BR )D k=l B k=l B B
fB 3 T B 3
E E E a + Z I a* (16)
k=l j = l i=l KJ1 k=l j = l KJ
B 3 T
+ E E E m,,.
k=l j=l i=l KJ
At this level of aggregation all terms must be considered
for there are no batteries behind the defense. Thus targets
missed due to both availability and reload time must be
considered. To reflect the relative importance of targets
missed as the position of a battery in a defense varies, a
weighting factor might be introduced. For instance, if a
defense of five batteries is organized with two batteries
on line followed by a third battery followed by the fourth
and fifth batteries on line, targets missed due to availa-
bility by batteries #1 and #2 would have little consequence
because a back up capability exists. However, batteries #4
and #5 must stop all targets. Hence, let q, denote a
weighting factor of a target missed by battery k. For
example, a possible set of weighting factors is:
U8









These reflect rapidly Increasing importance to a target
being missed as it penetrates the defense.
Using this weighting factor in Equation (16), the









k=l j=l K KJ
where q. and s, allow for possibly different weighting
factors for targets missed due to availability and for
targets missed due to reloading.
Again it appeared that suboptimization could present a
problem at this defense level. The optimal defense ordering
of warheads may not be five (or however many batteries there
are) optimal battery arrangements. In fact, if weighting
factors are used, the optimal defense ordering policy almost
certainly would not be five optimal battery arrangements.
Another possible form of an objective function involves
a slightly different weighting value than those in (17).
This method further places a weight upon what type of
targets are missed by which battery. It was assumed that
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five types of targets were possible. Hence, the objective












In this manner, the penalty for battery k missing a type 5,
target due to availability may be different from the same
battery missing the same target due to reloading. Using
misses due to reloading as an example, the weighting factor
for a battery in the first echelon of defense missing a
nuclear weapon carrier would be less than the weighting
factor for a battery in the last echelon missing the same
target. On the other hand, one of the five possible types
of targets may be of such low priority that no difference
in weighting factors between batteries is warranted. This
last objective function provides enough flexibility for
weightings for different missions and goals that virtually
any situation could be modeled. Unfortunately, solutions
of these possible objective functions would be quite
complicated. However, based upon the results of the section
analysis, it is apparent that suboptimization is a very real
possibility in this type of system and consequently, any




TABLE I: Probability Formulae for y-,?^, y^y?, and
y^y 3
Position of
Empty Launcher Probability of Occurrence12 3
yi (i-y 2 -y 3 )
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TABLE II: Probability Formulae for y 1
=yo» and y-i^Yp
Position of
Empty Launcher Probability of Occurrence12 3
























TABLE III: Probability Formulae for y2=y, and y,7ty 2
Position of
Empty Launcher Probability of Occurrence12 3























TABLE IV: Probability Formulae for y 1=y 2 and y ]/y 3
Position of
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TABLE VII: Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test Validating the
Simulation in One Case
H : the mass function of the simulation is the same as the
analytical mass function
H, : the mass function of the simulation is different from



















1 2 3 4 5 12 3 4 .20 .10 .05
X F (x) S15,000 ( x) l Po (x)
" S 15,000 (x)
20 .00000 .00000 • .00000
21 .00000 .00000 .00000
22 .00032 .00040 .00008
23 .00417 .00500 .00083
24 .07241 .07327 .00086
25 .19041 .19240 .00199
26 .42086 .42573 .00487
27 .66976 .67973 .00997
28 .86760 .87206 .00446
29 .96676 .96992 .00316
30 .99409 .99419 .00010
31 .99925 .99939 .00014
32 .99987 .99992 .00015
33 .99990 •99999 .00009
3^ 3..00000 1.00000 .00000




TABLE VIII: Analytical Mass and Survivor Functions for
a Permutation of Warheads with Decreasing
Order of Probability of Request
1 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 J 12 3 4 5
xj 1 I 2 2 3 3 4" 4" 5~ P~j .40 .25 .20 .10 .05
Number of Survivor

















Expected value (Eg) = 26.837
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TABLE IX: Analytical Mass and Survivor Functions for a
Permutation of Warheads with an Arbitrary
Order of Probability of Request
123456789 312 3 4 5
x
±
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 p . .40 .25 .20 .10 .05
Number of Survivor























TABLE X: Analytical Mass and Survivor Functions for a
Permutation of Warheads with an Increasing
Order of Probability of Request
3^56 789
5 4 4 3 3 2
315
p, .40 .25 .20 .10 .05
Number of Survivor
Targets Missed Mass. Function (F"1Q )
20 .0000 1.0000















Expected value (E 1Q ) = 24.435
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TABLE XI: Comparison of Close-Launcher versus Far-
Launcher Firing Doctrine for a Permutation
of Warheads with an Arbitrary Order of
Probability of Request
i 12 3^56789 J 123^5
~xj 1 2 3 4" 5 1 2 3 *T Pj .40 .25 .20 .10 .05
Part A: Close Launcher
Number of Survivor






































Expected value = 26.894
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TABLE XII: Comparison of Close-Launcher versus
Far-Launcher Firing Doctrine for a
Permutation of Warheads with a
Decreasing Order of Probability of
Request
i 123^56789 J 12 3 4 5































































Expected value = 28.300
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TABLE XIII: Comparison of Close-Launcher versus
Far-Launcher Firing Doctrine for a
Permutation of Warheads with an Increasing
Order of Probability Request
112 3 jj 5 6 7 8 9 J 12 3 4 5
"xj 5 4" 4" 3 3 2 2 1 I" ~p~j .40 .25 .20 .10 .05
Part A: Close-Launcher
Number of Survivor













































DIMENSION THREAT ( 5) ,MISSIL( 9 ) , FACTO), ST0PA(27C0,11),S
CTCRB(2700,11),PR0B(40) , MOVES (40)




C READ IN THE INITIAL ARRAY OF NINE WARHEADS.
C
READ (5,8010) (ST0RB(1,J) ,J=1,9)
8010 FCRHAT (9F2.0)
C
C READ IN THE PROBABILITIES OF THE FIVE TYPES CF






C THIS OUTPUT ENSURES THAT THE INITIAL WARHEAD ARRAY
C WAS READ IN PROPERLY.
C
WRITE (6,2040) (ST0RB(1,J) ,J=1,9)
8040 FORMAT CO*, 'FIRST ARRAY IS',9F3.0)
C
C THIS OUTPUT ENSURES THAT THE WARHEAD REQUEST
C PROBABILITIES WERE INPUT CORRECTLY.
C
WRITE (6,8050) THREAT
8050 FORMAT CO*, 'WARHEAD PROBABILITIES ARE*,5F1C3)
C
C THIS STEP DETERMINES WHEN ALL BRANCHES OF THE
C DECISION TREE HAVE BEEN DELINEATED.
C
2000 IF (STORB(l,9).EQ.0.0) GO TO 6000
C
C THIS STEP LOADS THE RESULTING ARRAYS FROM ThE


















C THIS STEP DETERMINES IF ALL ARRAYS IN THE PRESENT
C CALCULATIONS HAVE BEEN PROCESSED.
C
IF (ST0RA(NNN,1) .EG.O.O) GO TO 2000
C THIS STEP DETERMINES THE PROBABILITY FACTORS
C NECESSARY FOR THE CALCULATIONS DICTATED BY TABLES
C I THROUGH V.
C




c THE FORMULAE IN
c AND LINE 150.
c







C3))) GO TO 500
IF IMISSIL(1).EQ.MISSIL(2)) GO TC 390
IF <MISSIL(2).EQ.MISSIL(3)) GO TC 270
IF (MISSIL(1).EQ.MISSIL(3)J GO TC 150




CALL RELOAD ( MI SS I L
,
NCRIT )
IF tMISSIL(9).EQ.O) GO TO 53
DC 51 N = l,9
STCRB(Ne,N)=MISSIL(N)
51 CCNTINUE















CALL RELOAD ( MI SS I L ,NC RIT )


















CALL RELOAD ( M I SS IL NCRIT )















































































































































































































99 ILDS=STCRA(NNN T 11)+NCRITSFRCB=6.0*FACT<1)*FACT(2)*FACT<3)*ST0RA(NNN,10)/DEN




C TFE FORMULAE IN TABLE II ARE ENCCCED BETWEEN

























CALL RELOAD ( M ISS I L
,
NCRIT )




















CALL RELOAD (MISSIL, NCRIT)










SFPCB=FACT( 1)**2*( 1.0-FACT( 2) )
*
STCRA ( NNN , 10
)
/DEN
N'CVES( ILDS) = MOVES( ILDSi+1
PPGB ( LDS)=PRG6( ILDSJ+SPROB








































































































(9) .EQ.O) GO TO 274
1,9
A)=MISSIL(IA)









(9) .EQ.O) GO TO 282
1,9
C)=MISSIL(IC)






GC TO 2 84
282 ILDS=STCRA(NNN,11)+NCRIT
SFROB=FACT(2)*( 1 . O-FACT ( 1 ) -F ACT ( 2 ) ) *STOR A < NNN, 10 J /DEN
MCVES( ILDS)=MOVES( ILDSJ+1
PR0B<1LCS)=PRGB( ILDSJ+SPRCB






CALL RELOAD (MISSI L ,NCRIT)





































SPR0B=FACT(2)**2*(1.C-FACT(1) )*STCRA(NNN ,1C J/DEN
MCVESt ILDS)=MOVES( ILDSl+1
PRCB(ILCS)=PROE(ILDS)+SPROB







CALL RELOAD ( M I SS I L , NCR IT )














C THE FORMULAE IN TABLE IV ARE ENCCCED BETWEEN






CALL RELGAD ( M ISS I L
,
NCRIT )



















CALL RELOAD ( MISS IL ,NCR IT
)









SPR0B=FACT(3J*(1.C-FACT(1) ) *STOPA (NNN, 10 ) /CEN
MCVESt ILDS)=MGVES( ILDSJ+1
PROB(ILCS)=PROB( ILCSJ+SPROB






CALL RELOAD ( M ISS IL NCRIT )





















CALL RELGAD ( MI SSI L , NCRIT
IF (MISSIL(9).EQ.0J GO TO 418





















































































































































AE IN TABLE V ARE ENCODED BETWEEN
INE 5000.
D (MISSIL, NCRIT)












(9J.EQ.0) GO TO 512
1,9
S)=MISSIL(JS)

























GC TO 5 00O
500C CCNTINUE
C
C TFIS OUTPUT GIVES THE MASS FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER
C CF MOVES REQUIRED TO EMPTY THE STORAGE BARNS AND
C ALSO THE NUMBER OF BRANCHES YIELDING EACH PARTICULAR
C VALUE CF NUMBER CF MOVES.
C
6000 WRITE (6,8095)
8095 FORMAT CO', "THE PROBABILITIES CF MOVES ARE THE CCCUR
CRENCES CF MOVES ARE')
DC 600 1=1,40
WRITE (6,3100) I, PPOBd ),MOVES( I )










C THIS OUTPUT ENABLES A VISUAL CHECK TO DETERMINE IF
C THE MASS FUNCTION SUMS TO ONE AND HOW MANY BRANCHES
C EXISTED IN THE ENTIRE TREE.
C
WRITE (6,8105) PSUM,IPATH








C THIS SUBROUTINE RELOADS THE EMPTY LAUNCHERS AND COUNTS
C THE NUMBER CF MOVES REQUIRED. WHEN THE BARN IS EMPTY,
C THE FINAL TOTAL OF MOVES IS OUTPUT. THE PELQAD









IF (LNCHRS(MJ).NE.O) LSTORE=LSTCP E+l
10 CCNTINUE
IF (LCHEPT.EQ.O.OR.LSTORE.EG.O) RETURN
IF (LCHEPT.LE.LSTOPE) GO TO 70
GC TO ( 15,20,40) ,LCHEPT
15 RETURN











DC 35 MKK=4 t 9
IF (LNCHRS(MKK) .NE.O) GO TO 37
35 CONTINUE





40 IF (LSTCRE.NE.l) GO TO 55
43 DC 45 ML=4,9
IF <LNCHR9(MU.NE.O) GO TO 50
45 CONTINUE




55 DC 60 MN=4»9






70 DC 100 MN*1,3
IF (LNCHRS(MN).NE.O) GO TO 100
MIN=MN+1
DC 75 MI=MIN,9

















C READ IN THE NUMBER CF MISSILES Ifl THE SECTICN.
READ (5,1050) IBASLD
1050 FORMAT (• «,U)
C





C READ IN THE PROBABILITIES OF A REQUEST FOR A
C PARTICULAR WARHEAD. THE FIRST PROBABILITY IS FOR THE
C TYPE 1 WARHEAD, THE SECOND PROBABILITY IS FCP THE TYPE
C 2 WARHEAD,-ETC. FIVE NUMBERS MUST BE INPUT. THE FIVE















C THIS OUTPUT ENSURES THAT THE WARHEAD PROBABILITIES
C WERE INPUT PROPERLY.
C
WRITE (6,1600) (PROPOR(NNN) ,NNN=1,51
1600 FORMAT (• • , • THE WARHEAD PROBABILITIES ARE',5F10.3)
C
C THIS SINULATION WILL EE RUN 10,000 TIMES. EACH RUN












C THIS CHECKS IF A LAUNCHER CONTAINS A WARHEAD CF THE
C TYPE REQUESTED. THE LAUNCHERS ARE CHECKED STARTING
C WITH THE ONE CLOSEST TO THE STORAGE BARNS, THEN
C CHECKING THE NEXT LAUNCHER OVER, AND FINALLY
C CHECKING THE LAUNCHER FARTHEST FRCM THE eAFN.
C
c
IF (MISSIL(4-N).EQ.L0CK0N) GO TO 30
20 CCNTINUE








IF (NCOUNT.LT.IBASLD) GO TO 15
JMOVES(NCRIT)=JMOVES(NCRIT)+l
50 CCNTINUE





C THIS OUTPUT ENABLES A VISUAL CHECK OF WHETHER THE
C RANDOM ST-RING OF REQUESTS CONTAINS THE PPCPER
C PROPORTION OF TYPES.
C
WRITE (6,1800)










C THIS OUTPUT PROVIDES THE MASS FUNCTION OF TFE NUMBER











SUBROUTINE TARGET ( POINTS, MEXP, JCCLNT, IX)
DIMENSION PCINTSU),JC0UNT(5)
C
C THIS SUBROUTINE GENERATES THE RANDOM STRING OF
C WARHEAD RtGUESTS. A RANDOM NUMBER BETWEEN ZERO AND
C Or*E IS GENERATED AND THEM THIS NUMBER IS CCVPARED
C WITH THE INPUT WARHEAD PROBABILITIES IN ORDER TO
















C THIS SUBROUTINE RELOADS THE EMPTY LAUNCHERS AND CCLNTS
C THE NUMBER OF MOVES REQUIRED. WHEN THE EARN IS EMPTY,
78

c THE FINAL TCTAL OF MOVES IS OUTPUT. THE RELOAD













IF (LCHEPT.LE.LSTCREJ GO TO 70
GC TO ( 15,20,400 ,LCHEPT
15 RETURN
20 IF (LNCHRS(3) .NE.O) GO TO 33
DC 25 MK=4,9














40 IF (LSTORE.NE.l) GO TO 55
43 DC 45 ML=4,9






55 DC 60 MM=4,9
IF (LNCHRS (MM) .NE.O) GO TO 65
60 CONTINUE
65 LNCHRS<2)=LNCHRS(MM)
LNCHRS ( MM) =0
MGVES=M0VES+(MM-2)
GC TO 43
70 DC 100 MN=1,3
IF (LNCHRS(MN) .NE.O) GO TO 100
MIN=MN+1
DC 75 MII=MIN,9
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